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Budgetary balances adjustments from governmental accounting into national accounts 
in EU countries: 
can deficits be prone to management? 
 
Abstract 
European Union (EU) countries are required to achieve deficit targets, thus incentivized to 
select instruments to keep on limits. This paper argues that accounting discretion might be used 
in managing some adjustments made when translating data from Governmental Accounting 
(GA) into National Accounts (NA), in order to window-dress their final deficit/surplus reported 
to EUROSTAT. The empirical research evidences certain circumstances that might facilitate 
the use of GA-NA ‘adjustments discretion’. EU authorities must pay special attention to these 
conditions, to assure reliability of the deficits reported. Main findings also could assist in future 
efforts to improve the integrity of the adjustment process. 
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When reporting to EUROSTAT, particularly for the purpose of deficit assessment, European 
Union (EU) member-states follow National Accounts (NA) rules, basically the requirements of 
the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA). However, the information 
reported is gathered from Governmental Accounting (GA), namely from budgetary reporting. 
In this process, several adjustments are needed when translating data from GA into NA. 
Regarding the deficit/surplus, these adjustments relate to: the scope of the general government 
sector, the accounting basis (for most countries GA budgetary balance is still cash-based, while 
NA budgetary balance according to ESA is accrual-based), financial and non-financial 
transactions comprised or not in the GA balance, and operations of lending/borrowing with 
other entities linked to the Central Government. 
These adjustments raise questions about the reliability of the final deficit/surplus 
reported within the Excessive Deficits Procedures (EDP) requirements, casting doubts about 
NA data accuracy and trustworthiness to assess the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria, and 
to monitor EU fiscal policy. These issues are enhanced by the fact that some categories of GA-
NA adjustments might be prone to management. 
In the last decades, GA reforms have been mostly concerned with moving from cash 
into accrual basis systems. One important discussion that emerges from these reforms is the 
introduction of the accrual basis also in budgetary accounting. Most countries across the EU 
and the US, have adopted accrual basis in GA financial reporting but not in their budgetary 
systems, namely in what concerns the budget preparation and reporting of budgetary 
performance (Lüder and Jones 2003; CBO 2006 2018; Benito and Bastida 2009; Moretti 2016). 
Therefore, the distinction between budgetary and financial reporting systems is important. 
While the former are still connected to mixed cash/commitments accounting bases, financial 
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reporting systems are mostly linked to modified or full accrual accounting, with different 
practices and degrees of implementation across countries (van der Hoek 2005; PwC 2014; Jorge, 
Jesus, and Laureano 2016; CBO 2018). Consequently, the lack of harmonization is still a 
problem concerning GA systems, namely among EU member-States. 
On the other hand, NA is the first internationally harmonized reporting system, aiming 
to calculate key aggregate indicators so that the whole national economy might be evaluated, 
including comparisons with other countries’ aggregates (Bos 2008). EU member-states are 
obliged to follow ESA to prepare their NA, for the specific purpose, among others, of 
supporting the European monetary policy. This implies monitoring national aggregates such as 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), public deficit and public debt. ESA is therefore the harmonized 
conceptual framework for EU member-states’ NA, on the basis of which one obtain the ratios 
established in the Maastricht Treaty and required by the protocol on the EDP. These criteria are 
the fundament for assessing and monitoring the budgetary discipline of EU member-states, 
under the European Monetary Union (Benito and Bastida 2009). 
In this context, one question that might be raised concerns knowing whether the current 
GA systems in the EU countries are able to meet ESA requirements. Accordingly, the 
relationship between GA and NA is an important matter, especially concerning General 
Government Sector (GGS) data to NA. These data are obtained from GA systems, which are 
not harmonized and present significant divergences to NA. Such issues may question the 
relevance, reliability and comparability of the aggregates that sustain financial decisions of EU 
member-States (Benito and Bastida 2009). 
Framed by the earnings management approach, this paper analyzes the role of GA-NA 
adjustments as a way of managing the final budgetary balance (deficit/surplus), reported in NA 
to EUROSTAT by EU member-states for the purpose of deficit assessment. 
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While assuming that countries resort to any instrument at their disposal in order to show 
the accomplishment of the budgetary balance target, this paper argues that accounting discretion, 
managing GA-NA adjustments, might be used by countries to window-dress their final 
budgetary balances. In particular, it considers that certain circumstances, in each country and 
each year, facilitate the management and reporting of GA-NA adjustments to present a desired 
final deficit/surplus. 
The main research question the paper tries to answer might be put as follows: 
Are there characteristics of each country, in each year, especially related to 
economic conditions that, while determining GA-NA adjustments materiality, may 
encourage their management and ultimately the management of the final deficit/surplus 
reported in NA to EUROSTAT? 
Accordingly, the empirical analysis, using data from EDP reporting regarding central 
governments of all EU member-states for 2007 to 2012, explores some situations (especially 
relating to economic conditions) that might constitute factors encouraging NA deficit/surplus 
management via GA-NA adjustments. 
These economic circumstances relate to, e.g., the economic growth, the economic crisis 
period, being part of the euro zone, the accomplishment with the Maastricht treaty convergence 
criteria1, and the GA budgetary balance as a result of the budget accomplishment. 
Whilst identifying GA-NA budgetary balances adjustments and discussing how their 
materiality might be affected, this research evidences circumstances that may foster 
management of those adjustments. In doing so, it makes important contributions both to the 
literature and for practice. 
                                                            
1 According to Article 104 of the Maastricht treaty concerning budgetary discipline, convergence criteria 
relate to the public deficit and the public debt limits. The former cannot exceed 3 percent of GDP, while the latter 
cannot exceed 60 percent of GDP. 
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It fills the literature gaps, adding about the understanding of which factors might affect 
the materiality of GA-NA deficit-related adjustments (especially of some more susceptible to 
management); these factors represent circumstances encouraging the use of accounting 
discretion. Literature shows that countries ‘cheat’ when reporting their deficits (e.g., Brück and 
Stephan 2006; Milesi-Ferretti 2003) and that some political factors affect that cheating; but it 
does not address whether and how a country’s economic conditions affect the adjustments to 
the deficit reported. For practice, raising the issue of GA-NA budgetary balances adjustments 
discretion, the paper calls the attention of EU authorities to some adjustment categories that, in 
certain circumstances, might leave room for maneuvering, so requiring particular scrutiny. 
Finally, this paper also offers some reflections for policy making, namely in what regards 
approaching GA and NA systems as an important process for improving the quality and 
reliability of the reported data within the EDP. 
Henceforth the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the theoretical 
approach used to frame the research question. Section three addresses the adjustments that occur 
when passing from GA (micro level) into NA (macro level), regarding the budgetary balances 
to be reported to EUROSTAT. Section four presents the empirical study, starting from the 
methodological issues and then presenting and discussing the main findings. At last, concluding 
remarks and research implications are presented in section five. 
 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
This research assumes that accounting discretion might be used to manage reported deficits by 
managing GA-NA budgetary balance adjustments, especially within certain adjustment 
categories. 
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At a country’s level, the budgetary balance might approximate to ‘earnings’. Therefore, 
literature on earnings management and economic and political incentives to fraud financial 
statements in order to achieve specific stakeholders requirements (e.g., Eisner 1984; 
Christensen and Mohr 1995; Petersen 2003; Stalebrink 2007; Stalebrink and Sacco 2007; 
Anessi-Pessina and Steccolini 2009a 2009b) was used to inform the conceptual framework for 
this study. 
Within the earnings management framework, accounting discretion has been vastly 
analyzed in the finance and accounting literature referring to the private or business sector 
context. Contrarily, in the public sector, studies are still rare and mostly focused at the 
organizational level (Christensen and Mohr 1995; Stalebrink 2007; Anessi-Pessina and 
Steccolini 2009a 2009b), although increasing namely due to the approximation between 
business and public sector accounting (Pilcher and Van der Zahn 2010). 
Either in the private or in the public sector, the main idea underlying this framework is 
that, at the organizational level, earnings management occur when decision-makers resort to 
some creativity by means of accounting discretion to manage/change the reported financial 
performance/position. Financial information is manipulated intending to signal a certain 
situation to stakeholders (e.g. investors), namely to meet particular expectations. Managers and 
decision-makers might have incentives to report more favorable financial pictures of the 
organization (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Stalebrink and Sacco 2007). 
However, this research focuses a macro level scenario. Therefore, it searches for factors, 
which might constitute incentives to use some ‘accounting creativity’ in order to report a more 
convenient deficit/surplus position in terms of EDP. 
In the public sector, authors such as Eisner (1984) and Petersen (2003) referred to 
practices to measure, manage and report budgetary deficits that, although within the US context, 
are related to some of the GA-NA budgetary balances adjustment categories. Eisner (1984) 
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mentioned, among others, off-budget items and credit extension, contingent expenditures and 
investment assets not systematically accounted for. Petersen (2003) explained that deficit 
reductions tend to be achieved by practices other than raising taxes or reducing spending, 
namely changing the assumptions underlying the budget, altering the timing and recognition of 
various flows, or even redefining what constitutes revenues and expenditures. He adds, 
referring to techniques contributing to an apparently balanced budget, such as: over-estimation 
of revenues, internal borrowing, assets sales, acceleration on revenues and delays in spending, 
and anticipated future savings. GA-NA deficit-related adjustments, regarding the recognition 
or not of certain operations, the concepts of budgetary revenues/expenditures and the 
accounting basis, fit in the abovementioned ‘creative’ practices. 
In the field of economics, a few studies have also pointed to some creativity while 
reporting deficits in the context of the EU. Brück and Stephan (2006) proved that Eurozone 
governments cheat in reporting their budget deficits forecasts, since the adoption of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), especially in periods prior to general elections. They conclude that 
“The Pact creates incentives for governments to mislead their electorates about budget deficit 
forecasts” (p.4). Milesi-Ferretti (2003) studied the effects of fiscal rules when the government 
has a margin for ‘creative accounting’. In her analysis, she highlighted that the numerical rules 
imposed by the SGP “may encourage the use of dubious accounting practices, thereby reducing 
the degree of transparency in the government budget. These concerns have gained strength with 
the use of ‘creative accounting’ by a number of European countries in order to facilitate meeting 
the budget deficit ceiling established in the Maastricht treaty” (p.378). These authors point to 
some issues concerning the fact that creativity might exist while reporting to the EUROSTAT, 
if a country is included in the Eurozone, thus committed with convergence deficit limits.  
Furthermore, empirical reports, such as those by Koen and Van den Noord (2005) and 
Mora and Martins (2007), explained some one-off measures taken by the EU member-states in 
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order to achieve the Maastricht criteria to the Eurozone adhesion, or in the subsequent years to 
accomplish with those criteria. The authors referred to operations such as privatizations, tax 
amnesties, pension funds acquisitions and sales of third-generation mobile-phone (UMTS) 
licenses, as had been used by the member-States to reduce their deficit figures in a specific 
period; these were decisions of a non-current nature, with impact in one or few years, not 
representing a better financial performance in fact, but only the use of fiscal discretion to 
achieve a concrete momentary objective. The case of Portugal between 2002 and 2003, 
analyzed by Mora and Martins (2007), is a relevant example, inasmuch as a set of one-off 
measures as those mentioned above represented 1.4 percent of the GDP. Also the case of Greece 
is very interesting, considering that this member-state has used one-off measures to shape the 
deficit and debt data, both to enter the Eurozone and after, in order to accomplish with the 
European monetary union convergence criteria (Koen and Van den Noord 2005). 
In the last years, the political and economic debate, especially associated to the context 
of crisis in some EU countries and the problems regarding the accomplishment of the SGP, 
have pointed to issues relating to certain economic circumstances in the country, which might 
be relevant to affect not only the category of GA-NA deficit-related adjustments to be made, 
but also their materiality, therefore possible of encouraging adjustments discretion and 
ultimately the management of the final deficit/surplus reported in NA. 
The explanation above supports the reasoning of using an earnings management 
approach for managing budgetary balances. However, no literature was found addressing 
particularly the effects of a country’s economic conditions on that management. Moreover, one 
did not find any references to the particular effects of those conditions on GA-NA adjustments. 
Therefore, this is an innovative study, considering it explores a different perspective of the 
earnings management approach to analyze a specificity of the EU member-states deficit 
reporting context. 
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The next section briefly addresses the relationship between GA (micro perspective) and 
the NA (macro perspective), explaining the budgetary deficit-related adjustments necessary to 
make when reporting from the former into the latter. 
 
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING VERSUS NATIONAL ACCOUNTS: 
ADJUSTMENTS IN BUDGETARY BALANCES 
 
The GA-NA Relationship 
 
As explained, the Maastricht treaty convergence criteria for EU member-states are assessed on 
the basis of a harmonized reporting system of NA supported by the ESA. The ESA framework2 
offers guidance, tables and procedures for countries to report to EUROSTAT, namely within 
the scope of the EDP. A full accruals basis of accounting is implicitly used for the recognition 
of most flows. 
Nevertheless, public sector data reported to the convergence criteria are derived from 
(micro) GA systems (mostly budgetary reporting systems), drawn upon the rules in practice for 
each country. Despite all with some kind of accrual accounting, GA systems are not yet 
harmonized inter countries, and in some cases, neither within each country. Additionally, in 
many countries, budgets and budgetary accounting are still cash-based (Lüder and Jones 2003; 
Blöndal 2003; van der Hoek 2005; Brusca and Montesinos 2014). 
Therefore, when reporting to EUROSTAT for the purpose of deficit assessment, 
countries start from the so-called ‘working balance’ (deficit/surplus) in GA and make 
adjustments to get the final deficit/surplus in NA for convergence evaluation. These 
                                                            
2 Regulation (EU) 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 21 May 2013—European 
System of National and Regional Accounts in the European Union. Published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union, L174, Vol.56, 26.06.2013. 
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adjustments result from conceptual differences between the two accounting and reporting 
systems (GA and NA), among which there are those regarding accounting principles, such as 
recognition criteria – cash versus accrual basis (Lüder 2000; Keuning and Tongeren 2004; Dasí, 
Montesinos, and Murgui 2013; Jesus and Jorge, 2016). 
In spite of recent GA reform trends in EU member-states, moving from cash into 
accruals (PwC 2014), differences still remain due to the co-existence, in some countries, of two 
different accounting bases in GA – accrual basis for financial accounting and cash basis for 
budgetary accounting. This is particularly relevant given that the data from GA into NA are 
based on budgetary reporting (van der Hoek 2005; Barton 2007). Since in some countries (e.g., 
Spain and the UK) GA working balance is already reported in accrual basis, while in others is 
still cash-based, the adjustments range from highly diverse and material, to a reduced number 
and of low magnitude (Jesus and Jorge 2015). 
Authors as Keuning and Tongeren (2004) and documental sources (e.g., IPSASB 2012) 
additionally identify other specific issues concerning differences between GA and NA that raise 
a need for adjustments when translating data from one system into the other. Particularly 
interesting are papers pointing out to the materiality and diversity of those adjustments, 
questioning the reliability and comparability of the final deficits/surpluses reported by EU 
member-states within the EDP (Jesus and Jorge 2014 2015). They raise doubts about NA data 




According to the inventories of sources and methods 3  each EU member-state discloses 
(henceforth called inventories), the need to make deficit-related adjustments from GA data into 
                                                            
3 Available to all EU member-States at http://ec.europa.eu/Eurostat. 
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NA arises essentially from conceptual differences between the two reporting frameworks. The 
main adjustment categories relate to: (a) cash-to-accrual adjustments; and (b) reclassification 
of some transactions (Jesus and Jorge 2014 2015). 
Regarding cash-to-accrual adjustments, derived from different recognition criteria, the 
Inventories describe the adjustments each country makes in order to transform cash-based data 
into accrual-based data, considering issues such as taxes, social contributions and other 
receivables, interest, and primary expenditure. In this matter, the analysis of the inventories 
allows to observe that the procedures are not harmonized between countries, both in terms of 
the issues adjusted and in the way the adjustments are done. As to the adjustments related to 
reclassification of some transactions, the procedures described in the Inventories tend to be 
similar among the countries and concern to: (i) capital injections in state-owned corporations; 
(ii) dividends paid to GGS entities; and (iii) military equipment expenditure and EU grants 
(Jesus and Jorge 2014 2015). 
The quantitative impact of the GA-NA deficit-related adjustments may be measured 
using data from EDP reporting notifications each country submits to EUROSTAT twice a year. 
In those notifications, TABLE 2A provides data related to central government deficit/surplus 
reported by EU member-states, conveying the categories and amounts of adjustments to pass 
from central government accounts ‘working balance’ (GA)4  into central government final 
deficit/surplus (NA). 
Dasí, Montesinos, and Murgui (2013) explained that the ‘working balance’ in GA must 
be adjusted for the net lending/borrowing in NA and those adjustments can be classified into 
four categories, as resulting from: (i) Differences in the classification of transactions between 
financial and non-financial public entities; (ii) Differences in time of recording, basis of 
                                                            
4 This is the deficit/surplus resulting from the budgetary execution, reported in cash basis in some countries 
and in accrual or mixed bases in others. The Inventories show that a few countries display mixed accounting basis, 
meaning they use cash in some transactions and accruals in others. 
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recognition and time period; (iii) Differences in the delimitation of the public sector; and (iv) 
Other adjustments. 
Following previous research (Jesus and Jorge 2015), this paper points out (see table one) 
that some of the adjustment categories are related to the conceptual differences already 
identified, whereas others are not. 
 
< Table 1> 
 
Some of these adjustment categories are critical, in the sense that they might be prone 
to be conveniently managed, including resorting to one-off measures, especially if they show 
to be material in relation to the GA ‘working balance’, hence having high impact on the NA 
deficit/surplus. Categories B (non-financial transactions not included in the ‘working balance’) 
and C (accounting basis adjustments) are good examples. 
Regarding category B, some sporadic operations may not be reported under GA and 
consequently some discretion is possible when reporting in NA. E.g., according to Koen and 
Van den Noord (2005), some non-financial transactions between the GGS and other entities, 
such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) and concessions agreements, were sometimes not 
considered by Portugal, Spain and the UK. Jesus and Jorge (2014) refer to warranties offered 
by governments to development funds and credit insurances companies. 
In what concerns category C, using different recognition and measurement criteria may 
lead to lower final deficit or even to reach a surplus. Specifically about this adjustment category, 
different countries make different adjustments according to each subcategory mentioned in 
table one – interest, taxes and other receivables, and payables (Jesus and Jorge 2015). Because 
of this, accounting basis adjustments represent a mean each country may use to manage its 
deficit/surplus in a specific year, deferring or anticipating the recognition of certain transactions 
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(for example, taxes or other accounts payable). An example of this type of operations is the 
fiscal debt securitization adopted by Portugal in 2003, representing 1.4 percent of the 
Portuguese GDP by anticipating tax revenues in that year; another case is the Portuguese Mail 
(CTT) pension fund transference, also in this country in 20035, with a positive impact on that 
year deficit, but with negative consequences on the future periods deficits (Koen and Van den 
Noord 2005). 
Category A (financial transactions included in the ‘working balance’), although related 
to recognition criteria differences, does not seem to be susceptible of managing, since it reflects 
financial transactions that are recognized under a cash basis in GA and must be converted into 
balance sheet stocks in NA. Consequently, the adjustment is technical and must be made and 
recognized by all countries that report the ‘working balance’ in cash basis. Adjustments in this 
category include operations such as financial or non-financial assets sales or acquisitions, which 
are considered in the GA ‘working balance’, but are not flows in NA.  
Category D (balance of other central government entities), related to the delimitation of 
the GGS sector, is manageable in the sense that countries may or may not include some entities 
(for example, reclassified entities – entities that were not part of the GGS sector but because 
they present successive deficits financed by governments, they must become included in its 
perimeter). The criteria for these reclassifications may be susceptible to be manageable, so this 
adjustment category is also critical. 
Category E (other adjustments) is also conceptually susceptible to management because 
it essentially concerns reclassifications of some transactions countries might have not reported 
in a proper way. Examples of these include the reclassification of capital injections in state-
owned companies – according to ESA rules these transactions must be considered financial 
                                                            
5  By then CTT was a state-owned company. While transferring the pension fund (receivables), the 
Portuguese government improved the final deficit in that year, but assumed the responsibility for paying the future 
pensions to the CTT employees. 
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transfers, hence due to affect the deficit; when members-states do not report in this way, the 
EUROSTAT requires adjustments to be made afterwards. Such operations were carried out in 
Portugal, France and Germany, around 2002-2003 (Koen and Van den Noord, 2005). However, 
these reclassifications are highly under EUROSTAT scrutiny and the space to management is 
increasingly limited. 
The above discussion shows that the management of these adjustments demands for 
further research, particularly exploring circumstances that possibly encourage deficit/surplus 
management, taking advantage of adjustment materiality and of accounting discretion. 
In the next section, the paper performs an empirical analysis with this purpose. The 
theoretical framework, as explained, in the perspective used in this paper, does not allow a 
theoretical foundation in order to pre-establish hypotheses. Consequently, the paper explores, 






Sample and data. Central government data are used, gathered from both EDP reporting 
notifications (TABLES 2A from April 2012 and October 2013 notifications) and EUROSTAT 
statistics. The sample consists of all 27 EU member-states at that date, covering years 2007 to 
2012, in a total of 162 observations. 
This period was selected for several reasons. Firstly, it allows for a coherent comparison 
between adjustment categories – the way GA-NA adjustments are made, as well as their 
reporting, changed in 2005 and in 2013, making it difficult to harmonize and categorize 
adjustments if a larger period would have been considered. Then, it embraces ex-ante and ex-
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post years to the economic crises (2009 is generally acknowledged as the striking year in 
Europe). Finally, it comprises the largest number of EU countries with the exception of Croatia, 
which entered the EU in 2013. 
Regarding the dependent variable, it should represent the materiality (magnitude) of 
each adjustment category. Accordingly, the research uses eight dependent variables, taking into 
account the adjustment categories presented in table one. Given some specificities, categories 
C (accounting basis adjustments) and D (balance of other central government entities) were 
subdivided. 
For each adjustment category, materiality was defined as its weight in the absolute value 
of GA ‘working balance’, expressed in percentage. For instance, for category A – financial 





Adjustment amount of Category A
GA Budgetary balance
Materiality of Category A = ×      (1) 
As previously explained, the total amount of GA-NA adjustments results from 
transactions not yet included in the GA balance or already included but using different criteria 
than in NA. An adjustment category (adjustment magnitude) is considered material if the 
discretion it provides is sufficiently large to allow a country to reach a desirable final deficit. 
Therefore, it measures the impact of the adjustment (regardless the sign) in the final 
deficit/surplus. If a certain category is more material and more susceptible of being managed, 
countries have more incentive to use it for discretion (especially when certain economic 
circumstances occur). In the ratio, the adjustment amount is divided by the budgetary balance 
in GA (the so-called ‘working balance’), given that adjustments are added to or subtracted from 
that, to ‘correct it’ and get the final deficit/surplus in NA. 
Table two reports the summary statistics for the materiality of each adjustment category. 
Negative values make the adjustment to contribute to a higher deficit or a lower surplus and 
positive values otherwise. 
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Overall, there is large dispersion in materiality of all adjustment categories. Furthermore, 
the percentages on GA budgetary balance of certain adjustment categories in some years are 
largely higher (more than 100 percent) than the balance itself; for example, category C2 
(accounting basis adjustments related to other accounts receivable, including taxes and social 
contributions) shows a minimum of -1,697 percent (impacting negatively on the balance 
reported in NA), and category E (other adjustments) shows a maximum of 923 percent 
(impacting positively on the balance reported in NA). 
 
< Table 2> 
 
As already explained, this empirical analysis is exploratory. Although the theoretical 
framework, as it is used in this research, does not allow to derive hypotheses, it points to the 
choice of variables related to factors that have been mentioned  by some authors within the 
earning and budget management framework. Some of these issues have also generally been at 
the center of the political and economic debate as possible issues affecting EU countries’ 
deficits/surpluses reported to the accomplishment of the SGP. 
Accordingly, the research uses two dimensions of explanatory variables: 
• Economic conditions variables: 
o Economic growth, represented by the sign of the GDP percent change to 
previous year (1 –growth / 0 –recession); 
o Percent of GDP change to previous year, intending to analyze the effect of the 
magnitude of the variation of GDP; 
o GA budgetary balance (deficit/surplus) over GDP (percent), as a result of the 
budget accomplishment; 
o NA budgetary balance (final deficit/surplus) over GDP (percent), in the previous 
year; 
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o The economic crisis period, considered to affect the EU context, especially after 
2008 (1 –2009 or after / 0 –otherwise); 
o The accomplishment, in the previous year, of the deficit limit of the Maastricht 
treaty criteria (1 –yes / 0 –no); 
o Eurozone – the country belongs to euro area (1 –yes / 0 –no). 
• Control variables: 
o GA accounting basis (cash, accrual or mixed, defined as dummy variables); 
o Country’s size (natural logarithm of the population); 
o Country’s wealth (natural logarithm of the GDP per capita). 
In what regards GA accounting basis in particular, previous research shave already 
indicated that it is an important factor explaining GA-NA adjustment diversity and materiality 
(Jorge, Jesus, and Laureano 2014; Jesus and Jorge 2015). 
Table three reports the summary statistics for each explanatory variable. The majority 
of the adjustments reported occurred in years and countries of economic growth (64.2 percent), 
with an average GDP growth of 0.66 percent, but with deficit in GA budgetary balance (on 
average it represented 3.56 percent of the GDP). Furthermore, a small majority of the 
adjustments was reported by Eurozone countries (58 percent) and by countries that had not 
accomplished the deficit criterion in the previous year (50.6 percent); this final deficit in NA 
was, on average, of 3.34 percent of the GDP, slightly above the established limit of three percent. 
Finally, the majority of the adjustments (69.1 percent) have happened in countries using cash 
basis in GA reporting and in years of economic crisis, i.e., from 2009 onwards (66.7 percent). 
 
< Table 3 > 
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Statistical analysis and models. The statistical analysis seeks for some evidence that 
might associate the variables regarding the economic conditions in a country in a certain year, 
with the GA-NA deficit related adjustments. 
Panel regression models for the materiality of each adjustment category were estimated. 
The general model is presented as: 
 
'
it it itY X u= α + β +         (2) 
Where Y  is the dependent variable, 'iX  is the vector of explanatory variables, α  and 
the vector β  are the parameters to estimate, and itu  is the stochastic disturbance term. 
Moreover i  represents each of the 27 countries and t represents the period time (years 
2007 to 2012). 
 
The qualitative variables were introduced in the model as dummy variables, and for the 
accounting basis the reference category is cash (i.e., cash basis for all operations). 
Three estimation methods were used: Ordinary Least Squares (pooled OLS), Random 
Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) models. Moreover, F test (allowing to decide between an 
OLS model and a FE model), Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (allowing to decide 
between an OLS model and a RE model) and Hausman test (allowing to decide between a FE 
and a RE model) were performed, allowing to decide which model better fitted the purpose 
under analysis. In the majority of the regressions, the OLS is the preferred model (see bottom 
line of table four). In order to avoid possible misspecification problems, the regressions were 
run considering robust standard errors (Green 2002). In addition, we also computed the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for explanatory variables; the highest value obtained for GDP 
percent change to previous year was 2.649 and the lowest one for GA budgetary balance / GDP 
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was 1.108. These VIF values are very low and confirm the absence of linear dependence of the 
variables in table four, i.e., absence of multicollinearity problems. 
 
Findings and Discussion 
 
Table four displays the results of the eight regressions models. The results reported concern 
only the appropriate model for each adjustment category. 
 
< Table 4 > 
 
 
Among the explanatory variables just a few have a statistically significant impact on 
adjustment materiality: 
• Economic growth has a positive impact on categories B (non-financial transactions not 
included in the ‘working balance’) and D2 (balance of other central government entities, 
relating to net borrowing (+) or lending (-) of other central government bodies); 
• GDP percent change to previous year has a negative impact on categories C3 
(accounting basis adjustments regarding other accounts payable) and D2 (balance of 
other central government entities, relating to net borrowing (+) or lending (-) of other 
central government bodies); 
• Crisis period has a positive impact on category E (other adjustments); 
• Deficit accomplishment in previous year has a negative impact on category C3 
(accounting basis adjustments regarding other accounts payable); 
• The control variable mixed accounting basis has a positive impact on category C3 
(accounting basis adjustments regarding other accounts payable); and 
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• The control variable LN(Population) has a positive impact on categories C1 (accounting 
basis adjustments regarding interest paid and accrued) and C3 (accounting basis 
adjustments regarding other accounts payable). 
 
As to the variables concerning economic growth/recession, the positive effect of the 
economic growth on adjustment categories B and D2 might reflect overall a higher volume of 
those types of transactions. Non-financial transactions with other entities and 
borrowing/lending transactions between central government and other bodies, are likely to 
increase since there are generally more resources available; hence more materiality of these 
adjustments. In these cases, countries might have more incentives to use accounting discretion 
for these adjustments, to reach the targeted final balance in NA. 
On the other hand, when analyzing the magnitude of the GDP variation, there is a 
negative effect of the GDP percent change to previous year on categories C3 and D2, meaning 
that the higher the growth rate (the more a country’s GDP grows or less decreases), the lower 
the adjustment materiality in these categories. Therefore, a higher growth rate would allow a 
country to achieve the deficit limit with higher nominal deficit, not having the need to perform 
material adjustments relating both to the accounting basis used to recognize other accounts 
payable and to borrowing/lending transactions between central government and other bodies. 
Moreover, there is a positive effect of the economic crisis, considered from 2009 onwards, on 
the “other adjustments” (category E). The crisis made EU oversight authorities, namely the 
EUROSTAT, to better scrutinize member-States EDP reporting, often requiring corrections, 
which must be compulsorily included in this adjustment category. Although this is an 
adjustment category not directly manageable by each member-state, it evidences eventual 
previous manipulations. 
As to the deficit accomplishment in the previous year, it also affects materiality of 
accounting basis adjustments relating to other accounts payable (category C3). If and when the 
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country accomplishes with the deficit criteria in the previous year, it shows lower materiality 
in these adjustment category, or vice-versa. When the deficit target is accomplished in the 
previous year, in the current year countries might have less concern in postponing expenditure 
payments; i.e., in these circumstances they might be willing to pay in shorter run, leading to 
more coincidence between obligations and payments, hence fewer accounting basis adjustments 
are needed. So, the circumstance of a country accomplishing with the deficit limit in the 
previous year, seems to lead to fewer incentives in the current year to use accounting discretion 
while making GA-NA adjustments in category C3, to window-dress the final deficit reported 
in NA. 
Regarding the control variables, the accounting basis used in GA has a positive effect 
on the materiality of accounting basis adjustments relating to other accounts payable (category 
C3), meaning that the prevalence of a mixed accounting basis makes adjustment materiality in 
that category higher. The positive effects of the country’s population, as proxy for the country’s 
size, mean that more populated countries have more materiality of accounting basis adjustments 
both relating to interest paid and accrued (category C1) and to other accounts payable (category 
C3). 
The above discussion tried to offer some hints for the why certain economic conditions 
in countries might affect materiality of some categories of GA-NA deficit-related adjustments, 
particularly of those that might be the most susceptible of being manageable: non-financial 
transactions (category B), accounting basis adjustments (categories C1 and C3) and those 
relating to the scope of the GGS (category D2). 
Therefore, there are indications that incentives might exist to increase or decrease 
adjustments amounts, especially in certain categories. Overall, this confirms the assumption 
within the earnings and budget management theoretical framework – accounting discretion, 
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when used in these categories of adjustments, is likely to have a significant impact on the final 
deficit reported in NA. 
Finally, although some variables were not found statistically significant in this set, they 
still may be linked to materiality of certain categories of adjustments, hence encouraging the 
use of discretion. For example, if the GA balance, as a result of the budget accomplishment is 
far enough to the final deficit targeted in NA, countries might feel encouraged to manage the 
adjustments in order to achieve the target. However, if the gap is too large, countries may lack 
the ability to reach the target through the adjustments, and therefore might not use accounting 
description. Countries might increase their use of accounting discretion only when it makes a 
difference between meeting the limits or not. Another example relates to the Euros zone: either 
belonging or not to the Euro zone, countries might be equally constricted to accomplish with 
the deficit limits, either because they have to fulfill with the SGP criteria as Euro zone members 
or because they want to become members. Both groups of countries would then be incentivized 




This research presents a quantitative study, for the first time exploring circumstances of a 
country in a certain year, which might constitute incentives for EU governments to manage 
their final deficit/surplus in NA. This management is assumed to be done through the use of 
accounting discretion in GA-NA deficit related adjustments. 
The economic conditions identified as statistically significant might be important 
incentives to manage certain adjustment categories, subsequently encouraging accounting 
discretion to window-dress the deficit/surplus finally reported to EUROSTAT. They relate to: 
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the economic growth, the GDP percent change to the previous year, the economic crisis 
conjuncture and the deficit limit accomplishment in the previous year. 
While affecting deficit-related GA-NA adjustment materiality, these circumstances 
become facilitators to increase/decrease their amount, indicating that adjustments are 
manageable. Therefore, countries’ governments might seize these conditions and manage some 
transactions which affect more GA-NA adjustment materiality, namely non-financial 
transactions, other accounts payable and transactions related to other central government 
entities. 
The fact that most of the explanatory variables were not statistically significant, for any 
of the adjustment categories, is a finding to be emphasized. Indeed, there does not appear to be 
a clear pattern across the countries in what economic factors determine the materiality of the 
adjustments. Future research might enlighten on this matter by, for instance, exploring new 
approaches to testing the data over longer periods. This research is an early attempt to provide 
a more rigorous quantitative understanding of the adjustments, and the study has the salutary 
effect of motivating other researchers to consider alternative statistical approaches. 
The analysis also makes a contribution highlighting issues that need to be addressed by 
policy-makers. Nowadays micro national governmental accounting systems are changing to 
approach International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSASs); furthermore, a revised 
ESA has started to be implemented. Consequently, it is important to understand that 
approaching GA and NA systems must reduce at maximum the afore-mentioned adjustments. 
This is particular important for those which materiality seems to be more affected by certain 
economic circumstances the country is undergoing (hence more prone to management). Only 
this way the window-dressing in the final deficit reported might be reduced, assuring data 
reliability. 
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Accordingly, a future extension of this research could be to analyze the effects of 
ESA2010 in the deficit-related GA-NA adjustments and in their use as a mean for accounting 
discretion and deficit management. 
Although some work has been done in approaching GA and NA (IPSASB 2012 2014), 
this paper points to the importance of taking into practice all the theoretical efforts that 
ultimately have been developed regarding convergence between GA (IPSASs) and NA (ESA), 
hence reducing the adjustments required. If most countries still use cash-based (budgetary) 
reporting in GA while ESA requires accruals, and the definition and criteria for the reporting 
entity (especially at the level of the whole of government) differ in practice between the two 
systems, adjustments concerning the accounting basis, as those related to transactions with 
other central government entities, are likely to continue and consequently the deficit 
manipulation. 
Assuming that all countries window-dress their ratios for the convergence criteria, 
stricter control is needed by the oversight bodies, namely by the EUROSTAT; the ‘trust in 
member-states honesty’ is a strategy that has proved to failed in the latter years, leading to a 
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Deficit-Related Adjustment Categories and Conceptual Differences between GA and NA 
Adjustment categories Conceptual differences  
A.  Financial transactions included in the 
‘working balance’ 
Recognition criteria differences 
B. Non-financial transactions not included in 
the ‘working balance’ 
Not related 
C. Accounting basis adjustments 
C.1 Differences between interest paid and 
interest accrued 
C.2 Other accounts receivable (including 
taxes and social contributions) 
C.3 Other accounts payable 
Recognition criteria differences 
D. Balance (net borrowing or net lending) of 
other Central Government entities 
D.1 ‘Working balance’ (+/-) of entities not 
part of Central Government 
D.2 Net borrowing (+) or lending (-) of other 
Central Government bodies 
Definition and scope of reporting entity under 
GA and NA 
 
Preparation and disclosure of consolidated 
financial statements 
E. Other adjustments (including 
reclassifications, dividends paid to GGS 
entities, military equipment expenditure 
and EU grants) 
Relationship between government and 
government business enterprises and other 















A -10.06 123.34 -1,411.41 -2.04 0.00 9.36 187.58 
B -8.14 25.90 -161.82 -2.25 0.00 0.00 64.28 
C1 1.38 40.55 -77.93 -3.94 -0.49 0.44 488.69 
C2 -8.51 147.41 -1,696.97 -1.21 2.09 10.87 278.18 
C3 -13.48 58.96 -639.39 -7.79 -0.87 0.64 64.05 
D1 -1.44 26.72 -326.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.85 
D2 -4.92 50.86 -223.45 -6.81 0.00 3.01 380.30 
E -5.95 108.04 -766.78 -10.25 -1.29 0.22 922.62 









Summary Statistics for the Explanatory Variables 












0.66 4.31 -17.70 1.20 10.50
-3.56 3.76 -15.32 -3.19 6.27
-3.34 4.54 -30.60 -3.10 5.30
15.89 1.44 12.91 16.05 18.23










GDP change to previous year (percent)
GA budgetary balance / GDP (percent)










 Results of the Regression Models for Adjustment Categories’ Materiality  














































































































Deficit accomplishment in 














































































































































Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent level.
Adjustment categories (dependent variables)
Notes: Dependent variable is the materiality of the adjustments (percent). Total obs: 162.
 
 
 
 
